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two situations may ordinary operational negligence create an unsea-
worthy condition: by bringing into play a previously unseaworthy con-
dition, or by creating an unseaworthy condition which, after a break in
the continuity of events, subsequently causes injury.
FRANK F. ARNEss
Constitutional Law-RAcIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971).
Griggs and twelve other black employees brought this class action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 to enjoin Duke Power
Company from discriminating against them.2 Prior to 1965, when the
Act went into effect, Duke employed negroes only in its labor depart-
ment. Thereafter, Duke required a high school diploma and satisfactory
scores on two aptitude tests for all new employees-black and white-
who wished to transfer to any other department.' The district court
found no violation, holding that the tests were probably related to
necessary job skills.4 The court of appeals agreed that there was no
violation, holding that such tests need not be job-related.'
tional negligence. The Court in Usner distinguished the earlier decision of Crwnady
in terms of a defective winch and Mascuilli in terms of a prior unseaworthy condition
arising from the tightline condition. In following MitchelPs standard of reasonableness,
Usner is technically on firm ground, but Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent also appears
correct in stating that "Crumady cannot justly be distinguished" from Usner. 91 S. Ct.
at 520. While litigation on the question of whether instantaneous operational negligence
equates to unseaworthiness should abate as a consequence of Usner, the voluminous
and costly litigation on the other aspects of unseaworthiness will continue.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2) (1964) provides that:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-... (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race....
Id. § 2000e-2(h) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this [tide], it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act
upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that
such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended, or used to discriminate because of race....
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244 (MD. N.C. 1968).
3. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849, 852 (1971).
4. 292 F. Supp. at 250.
5. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1235 (4th Cir. 1970).
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The Supreme Court reversed, declaring that "Congress has com-
manded ... that any tests used must measure the person for the job and
not the person in the abstract." 6 Since blacks fare worse than whites
in both the education and testing requirements, and since the require-
ments were not shown to be related to successful performance of the
jobs for which they were used, the effect was unlawful discrimination. 7
Duke's lack of intent to discriminate was irrelevant when the conse-
quence of its requirements was discrimination, and there was a failure
to show a relationship between the requirement and the employment.8
Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there was no
uniform protection against discrimination in employment. The Civil
Rights Act of 1871 forbade only the violation of one's constitutional
rights by state action.9 In Whitner v. Davis, ° the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit said by way of dictum that no one had a consti-
tutional right to public employment but that, once employed, he had
a'right to be free from unreasonable discrimination with respect to that
employment." Under the Railway Labor Act, 2 the Supreme Court
held that labor unions must represent minority groups among railroad
workers without "hostile discrimination." 18 Thus, there was limited
.protection for government employees and railroad workers once they
had been hired, but no federal guarantee of freedom from racial dis-
crimination in hiring, transfers, or promotions. 4
However, thirty-five states had statutes prohibiting racial discrimi-
nation in employment by the time the Civil Rights Act of 1964 went
into effect.'6 Most of the states which had no such laws were in the
6. 91 S. Ct. at 856.
7. Id. at 853.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
10. 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969).
11. Id. at 30. There was no race issue in this case, and the court found for the
defendant who had fired plaintiff, a state university faculty member, for unprofessional
conduct. Id. at 27.
12. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964).
13. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944). See also Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.. 768 (1952); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944).
14. One can infer from the cases cited in notes 10 and 13 supra that only highly
unreasonable discrimination was thought to be unlawful, and no cases were found
which dealt with promotions or departmental transfers.
15. Purdy, Title VII: Relationsbip and Effect on State Action, 7 B. C. IND. & Com.
L. Rav. 525, 527 (1966).
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South, including North Carolina where the Griggs case arose. 16 The
definitions of discriminatory practice, of course, differed. As with
Title VII, voluntary compliance and agency hearings were the usual
practice,' 8 and most conciliation attempts were successful."
One of these agency cases was a factor in the inclusion of section
703 (h) in Title VII.10 The commission found that testing of the cul-
turally deprived was discriminatory." Section 703 (h) was designed to
protect the employer's right to use "professionally developed ability
tests," 22 while prohibiting their discriminatory use.2 Early commen-
taries recognized that if de facto discrimination resulted from the use
of tests, courts could find that they were "used" 24 to discriminate and
were, therefore, unlawful.25
Tide VII has been held to be a clear mandate to end racial discrim-
ination in employment, unhampered by strict construction or semantic
arguments.2  Each case is to be decided on its own merits. In the
only reported case involving section 703 (h) prior to Griggs, the court
declined to decide whether the tests had to be related to job skills be-
cause that point was not argued.28 It did hold, however, that the tests
16. Id. The states not having such laws were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
17. Id. at 526.
18. Id. at 532.
19. Kovarsky, The Harlequinesque Motorola Decision and Its Implications, 7 B. C.
Lm. & CoM. L. REv. 535, 537 n.12 (1966). Because of this success, there are no reported
Cases in point.
20. Id. at 541.
21. In re Leon Myart, complainant, and Motorola, Inc., respondent, Charge No. 63C-
127 (1964), in 110 CoNG. REc. 5662 (1964).
The examiner ordered Motorola to hire the Negro applicant tested. On appeal, the
order to hire was reversed, and the applicant was awarded damages of $1,000. Commis-
sion Decision on Review, Charge No. 63C-127, State of Ill. F.E.P.C. (1964). The
Chicago Circuit Court denied the agency's right to award damages, thus leaving the
applicant uncompensated and jobless, but did not reverse the examiner's findings of 'dis-
crimination. Motorola, Inc. v. Illinois F.E.P.C., 38 L.R.R.M. 2573, 2574 (1965).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
23. 110 CONG. REc. 7246 (1964); id. at 13724.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h) (1964).
25. Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
473, 487-8 (1966); Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
413,449,(1966).
26. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970).
27. See United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40, 52 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
The court declined to set up guiding rules, saying the purposes of the Act would
be best served by case-by-case decisions. Id.
28. Id. at 72.
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used were "validated," in part, by their relationship to necessary job
sklls.29
The Griggs case gives the first useful judicial interpretation of what
tests may or may not legally be used in a merit system scheme of pro-
motion. Section 703 (h) may be violated even when no intent to dis-
criminate on a racial basis is shown.30 If the educational requirement
or aptitude test is not shown to be related to necessary job skills, and
if it results in discrimination against blacks, it is unlawful.3s This hold-
ing gives judicial support to the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's guideline on the subject,32 and requires that employers be
prepared to demonstrate the relevance of the tests to the qualifications
for the job for which they are required. This is particularly true if
proportionately more whites than blacks meet the requirements. From
the tenor of the opinion, it is fair to predict that the Griggs rationale
will be extended to pre-employment tests when such a case arises.
NATALIE C. GILLETTE
Criminal Law-ExPLOITATION OF ILLEGAL ARREST. United States v.
Edmonds, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970).
After making a lawful arrest, FBI agents were assaulted by an
angry mob and forced to let their prisoner escape. The following day
other agents who had not been involved in the affray arrested four
defendants on the pretext of failure to have Selective Service cards in
their possession. 1 Defendants Were then escorted to FBI headquarters
in the hope that they could be identified by the victims of the assault.
.The ensuing identification resulted in courtroom identification testi-
29. Id. at 78. The court found that the tests were validated as plaintiff argued they
must be, by the company officials' evaluation and a showing that they were job-related.
ld.- at 76, 78. The court also said the tests need not be validated anyhow, since
plaintiff had not shown a discriminatory result. Id. at 77. The injunction sought
,against the use'of the tests was denied. Id. at 119.
30. 91 S. Ct. at 853.
31. -d. at 856.
32. § 1607.4(c), 35 Fed. Reg. 12333 (1970) demands that employers keep "data
demonstrating that the test is predictive of . . . important elements of work behavior
... relevant to the job...
1. Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 462(b) (6) (1968). Testimony
showed that the government, had never prosecuted for inadvertent failure to have
draft cards on an individual's person, and subsequent actions, at FBI headquarters in-
dicated they never intended to prosecute in this instance. United States v. Edmonds, 432
F.2d 557, 582 (2d Cir. 1970).
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